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Abstract
This paper considers two tenure modes—owner- and renter-occupied housing—and
models the effect of the rental externality and tenure security on single-family housing
quality. We show that both rental externality and tenure security reduce renter-occupied
housing quality when the user’s utilization, which reduces the quality of the accommo-
dation, and the owner’s maintenance, which raises quality, are substitutes. Using single-
family housing data in Japan, we obtain empirical results that are consistent with theo-
retical predictions. These results indicate that conventional wisdom—that the quality of
renter-occupied housing is lower than that of owner-occupied housing—is supported for
single-family housing in Japan.
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1 Introduction
There exist many rental housing properties with inadequate maintenance in the urban areas
of Japan. According to conventional wisdom, the quality of renter-occupied housing is lower
than that of owner-occupied housing. We offer a theoretical model and empirical results to
test whether or not conventional wisdom is supported for single-family houses in Japan.
There may be two mechanisms for explaining deterioration in rental housing quality. First,
a rental externality, defined by Henderson and Ioannides (1983), is a deterioration mecha-
nism for rental housing. Henderson and Ioannides argued that in rental housing contracts,
the right to use an asset is temporarily transferred to the tenant. Because tenants, unlike
owner-occupiers, do not necessarily care about future asset values, they tend to overutilize
dwellings. This leads to excessive deterioration of housing properties. This type of incentive
problem occurs because the detection of overuse is either too costly or not feasible for the
lessor (Benjamin et al. 1995). Galster (1983) found empirical evidence that owner-occupied
housing requires a higher maintenance effort and has a lower incidence of housing problems
than renter-occupied housing. Shilling et al. (1991) concluded that rental housing depreciates
faster than owner-occupied housing.1
Secondly, the security of tenure rights, such as extensions in tenure duration that provide
protection against eviction, also affect rental housing quality. Tenure security is complemented
by rent control, because without price regulation, the landlord can evict the tenant using rent
increases. A variety of forms of rent control exists in the world. Rent control forces rent
below market clearing levels. Tenancy rent control governs rent increases within a tenancy,
but has no power between tenancies (Arnott 2003). Contract-renewal rent control governs
rent increases not only within a tenancy, but also after tenancy (Seko and Sumita 2007). In
Japan, to prevent eviction through rent increases when the term of the tenancy expires, judicial
precedents from tenancy suits have established that the rent for an incumbent tenant, called
1Harding et al. (2000) argued that owners also have incentives to undermaintain their housing in the
following two circumstances. The first is because of the inability of prospective buyers to fully observe past
seller maintenance, and the second is a result of the limited liability of borrowers in the event of mortgage
default.
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here contract-renewal rent, is not permitted to exceed the rent, called market rent, of similar
newly rented units. That is, the tenant retains the option to renew the leasehold coupled with
a below-market price forced on the landlord. This control does not perfectly protect against
eviction; however, it indirectly increases the probability of renewal, and consequently ex ante
increases the length of the lease. Albon and Stafford (1990), Arnault (1975), Frankena (1975),
Kanemoto (1990), Kiefer (1980), Moorhouse (1972), and Seshimo (2003) developed theoretical
models to examine the impact of rent control (tenure security) on the maintenance of rental
dwellings. They showed that because rent control may reduce the profit of rental housing,
landlords reduce maintenance levels. Gyourko and Linneman (1990) found empirical evidence
that rent-controlled units are more likely to deteriorate than uncontrolled units. Sims (2007)
found that ending rent control leads to a significant reduction in chronic problems such as holes
in walls or floors, chipped or peeling paint, plaster damage, and loose railings. This empirical
result implies that rent control creates an overutilization problem in the tenant.
The first contribution of this paper is developed from a theoretical model and empirical
results that incorporate the two mechanisms: the rental externality and tenure security. On
the one hand, the influence of the rental externality on the quality of single-family house is
captured by comparing across the tenure mode. On the other hand, the influence of tenure
security on single-family housing quality is captured by comparing within the tenure mode.
The preceding studies, however, explored only one side of the mechanism: either the rental
externality or tenure security.
As mentioned, a large number of theoretical economic models and empirical results have
supported conventional wisdom. Several papers, however, have demonstrated that these results
are not robust. First, the empirical results of Gatzlaff et al. (1998) are inconsistent with theo-
retical models of the rental externality. They have found only weak evidence that maintenance
rates differ between owner- and renter-occupied housing. Furthermore, they have established
that owner-occupied housing depreciates relative to renter-occupied housing in some submar-
kets. Secondly, Olsen (1988) argued that if tenants maintain the quality of their housing,
rent control (tenure security) does not necessarily reduce the quality of rental housing. This
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is because rent reductions are transfers from landlords to tenants. Therefore, the theory is
ambiguous regarding the effect of tenure security on quality. Moon and Stotsky (1993) found
empirical evidence that rent control leads to deterioration in housing quality; however, the ef-
fect is weak. They hypothesized that tenants in rent-controlled units are more likely to engage
in self-maintenance, compensating for a lack of maintenance by landlords.
The second contribution of the paper is the finding that the rental externality and tenure
security help support conventional wisdom, despite the above counterexamples. First, all
previous theoretical models examined the decisions of owners and users in isolation. Olsen
(1988) considered both, but he modeled a switching of maintenance responsibility between the
landlord and the tenant. In fact, and as put forward by Miceli (1992), both decisions affect
housing quality. In this paper, we simultaneously consider an investment in housing from the
owner’s perspective and the user’s perspective, and examine the effect of the rental externality
and tenure security on the quality of single-family dwelling. Secondly, in previous theoretical
models, a tenant’s investment has been found to have completely different effects on housing
quality. Kanemoto (1990), Miceli (1992), and Olsen (1988) assumed that a tenant’s investment
has positive effects on rental housing quality, whereas Henderson and Ioannides (1983) assumed
that it has negative effects. In this paper, we examine these two polar cases.
The main results are as follows. We find that theory is unambiguous on the effect of
the rental externality and tenure security on single-family housing quality when we assume
that a tenant’s investment has negative effects on housing quality. That is, the quality of
renter-occupied single-family housing is lower than that of owner-occupied single-family hous-
ing because of the rental externality when the user’s utilization, which reduces the quality
of the accommodation, and the owner’s maintenance, which raises quality, are substitutes.
Furthermore, tenure security further reduces the quality of single-family rental housing in this
case. These results are consistent with conventional wisdom. Considering the rental externality
and tenure security jointly, our empirical results, which used the sample of single-family houses
from the 1998 Japanese Housing Demand Survey (JHDS), confirm the above theoretical pre-
dictions. Therefore, conventional wisdom is empirically supported for single-family dwellings
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in Japan.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first present a bench-
mark theoretical model without tenure security and investigate the effect of the rental exter-
nality on housing quality. We then introduce tenure security. The data and empirical model
used are discussed in Section 3, along with the empirical results. In Section 4, we discuss some
considerations of the theoretical model and empirical results. Section 5 summarizes the main
conclusions of the paper.
2 The model
2.1 The effects of the rental externality
A single-family housing unit can be owned or rented. Accordingly, there are two entities
involved: (i) the owner of the housing (the landlord); and (ii) the user of the housing (the
tenant). In this paper, we suggest that housing can be owned and used under the following
two tenure modes. The first type is owner-occupied single-family housing, in which the housing
unit is owned by an owner who leases it to himself or herself. In this case, entities (i) and (ii)
are the same individual. The second type is renter-occupied single-family housing, in which
the housing unit is owned by a landlord who leases it to a tenant.
In this section, we consider a two-period model without tenure security in which we focus
only on the effects of the rental externality on single-family housing quality. We introduce and
define tenure security in the next section.
Because we focus on the quality of housing, we assume that housing comprises a single unit
and that its construction cost is 0. At the beginning of period 1, a landlord and a tenant make
a one-period lease contract. The landlord offers the tenant of the dwelling with given housing
quality a fixed rent P1, and the tenant accepts the offer. Both the landlord and the tenant
undertake investment during period 1. Let m be the maintenance undertaken by the landlord
to mitigate quality deterioration during period 1 at cost c(m), for which cm > 0 and cmm > 0,
and t be the input undertaken by the tenant in period 1 at cost g(t), for which gt > 0 and
gtt > 0. The details of t are discussed below. Following Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and
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Kanemoto (1990), we assume that the landlord and the tenant observe t and m, but they are
not verifiable. This implies that the contract in period 1 cannot specify the levels of t and m.
As Kanemoto (1990) argued, if a complete contingent contract can be written and enforced,
cross-tenure differences do not matter at all. The tenant derives utility of v1(t), which can be
expressed in pecuniary terms, in period 1 from housing. The tenant’s input has positive effects
for his/her own living conditions in the dwelling at a decreasing rate. Therefore, v1t > 0, and
v1tt < 0. We assume m is completed at the end of period 1. As a result, the current level of m
does not affect the tenant’s utility in period 1. The tenancy terminates at the end of period 1.
The quality of single-family housing in period 2 (q2), which can be expressed in pecuniary
terms, is assumed to be a function of t and m. That is, t and m undertaken in period
1 have spillover effects on housing quality in period 2. Furthermore, additional investment
expenditures are assumed to be zero in the second period. The offered rent in period 2 (P2)
depends on the quality of housing q2 and on a broader array of market conditions ε2, e.g.,
inflation rate. We assume that P2 is of an additive form; i.e., P2 = q2(t,m) + ε2. The
maintenance increases q2(t,m) at a decreasing rate. Therefore, q2m > 0, and q2mm < 0.
The tenant’s input has completely different effects on housing quality in the previous stud-
ies. On the one hand, if t represents the effort to repair the unit, as described as Kanemoto
(1990), Miceli (1992), and Olsen (1988), then t has positive effects on housing quality. On the
other hand, if t represents the utilization intensity, as referred to by Henderson and Ioannides
(1983), or a level of abuse, as described by Benjamin et al. (1995), t has negative effects on
housing quality, because it damages walls and floors. In reality, both home improvement and
utilization may occur at the same time. For simplicity of the model, however, we consider the
following two polar cases.
Definition 1 The tenant’s input t represents a utilization (u) or a home improvement (i);
i.e., t = u or i. If t = u, then q2u < 0. We refer to the q2u < 0 as case U. If t = i, then
q2i > 0. We refer to the q2i > 0 as case I.
Representing a broader array of market conditions, ε2 is a random variable for which both
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the owner and the user know the probability distribution function f(ε2), which is assumed to
be uniform on the interval [0, ε¯2], where 0 < ε¯2.
2
The initial tenant benefits from the tenant’s input and the quality of single-family housing in
period 2. Therefore, the initial tenant derives utility from housing of v2(t,m) = b2(t, q2(t,m)),
which can be expressed in pecuniary terms, in period 2. We assume that b2t > 0 (t = u or i),
and (∂b2/∂q2) > 0. Then:
v2t = b2t +
(
∂b2
∂q2
)
q2t, (1)
is positive in case I (t = i), because q2i > 0. In case U (t = u), the sign of Eq. (1) is
indeterminate because q2u < 0. However, we assume that Eq. (1) is positive in case U. This
implies that the initial tenant values the positive side of utilization more than the negative
side of it. We also assume that v2tt < 0 (t = u or i), v2m > 0, and v2mm < 0.
We normalize the reservation utility level to 0 when the initial user lives in another dwelling
in period 2. Then the maximum rent that he or she pays for the dwelling while enjoying a
utility level of at least 0 is written as v2(t,m). Assume that the owner has no bargaining
power. Then, at the beginning of the second period, the owner of the housing offers the rent
P2 = q2(t,m) + ε2. The initial user renews the contract if the maximum rent is greater than
or equal to the offered rent. Otherwise, he or she moves to other housing and obtains their
reservation utility level.
To ensure that the initial tenant renews the contract, we assume the following:
v2(t,m) > q2(t,m).
This implies that the initial tenant values the extra utility from housing more than the market,
or that potential buyers or tenants are not willing to pay as much for housing as the current
user. We also assume that the tenant has a higher marginal benefit of m. Therefore:
∀t,m v2m > q2m.
2The effects of the rental externality on single-family housing quality do not depend on the functional form
of the probability distribution function. The effects of tenure security on the quality of single-family rental
housing, however, do depend on this simplifying assumption.
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In case U, v2u > q2u by assumption. To keep this relation in case I, we assume that v2i > q2i
for all i and m. In sum:
∀t,m v2t > q2t.
Furthermore, we assume that:
∃εˇ2 ∈ (0, ε¯2] v2(t,m) < q2(t,m) + εˇ2.
This implies that the maximum rent of the initial tenant can be less than the second-period
rent if we consider the random variable ε2. Therefore, this assumption ensures that the initial
tenant can potentially move to other dwellings.
The efficient renewal-move condition can be written as follows:
{
F (εˆ2) = Pr[v2(t,m) ≥ q2(t,m) + ε2] ⇒ renewal,
1− F (εˆ2) = Pr[v2(t,m) < q2(t,m) + ε2] ⇒ move,
(2)
where F (ε2) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of ε2. Eq. (2) implies that the tenant
renews the contract if ε2 is less than or equal to εˆ2, or otherwise moves to other housing in
period 2. We refer to εˆ2 as the critical value. From Eq. (2), we have:
εˆ2 = εˆ2(t,m) = v2(t,m)− q2(t,m).
The critical value therefore depends on both t and m.
Next, we consider the payoffs of each tenure mode. First, we examine renter-occupied
single-family housing. Assume that the landlord and tenant are both risk neutral and have
the same discount factor, set at unity. Then, from Eq. (2) and the assumption that f(ε2) is
uniform, the utility of the tenant can be written as:
VR = v1(t)− P1 − g(t) +
εˆ2
ε2
[
v2(t,m)− q2(t,m)−
εˆ2
2
]
, (3)
where the subscript R refers to renter-occupied housing.
Consider the landlord. For the case with no tenure security, the landlord obtains q2(t,m)+
ε2 whether or not the initial user renews the contract in period 2. Therefore, the landlord’s
profit can be written as:
ΠR = P1 − c(m) + q2(t,m) +
ε2
2
. (4)
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The solutions to Eqs (3) and (4) satisfy, respectively:
∂VR
∂t
= v1t +
εˆ2
ε2
(v2t − q2t)− gt = 0, (5)
∂ΠR
∂m
= q2m − cm = 0. (6)
These two equations define the tenant input function tR(m) and the landlord maintenance
function mR(t).
3 If the mixed partial derivative of the objective function with respect to t
and m is negative, both the tenant input function and the landlord maintenance function are
decreasing functions. That is, t and m are substitutes. We only consider this case following
Miceli (1992).4 The equilibrium input levels, t∗R and m
∗
R, can be found by simultaneously
solving Eqs (5) and (6).5
Consider next the owner-occupied single-family housing. The payoff for owner-occupied
housing is the sum of the initial user’s payoff (Eq. (3)) and the homeowner’s payoff (Eq. (4)).
From the assumption that f(ε2) is uniform, the utility of the owner-occupant can be rewritten
as:
VO = v1(t)− g(t)− c(m) +
εˆ2
ε2
v2(t,m) +
ε2 − εˆ2
ε2
[
q2(t,m) +
ε2 + εˆ2
2
]
. (7)
where the subscriptO refers to owner-occupied housing. Eq. (7) implies that the owner chooses
t and m to maximize not only his or her utility (the sum of the first and fourth terms on the
right-hand side), but also potential future tenants’ or buyers’ utilities (the last term on the
right-hand side).
The first-order conditions for t and m are:
∂VO
∂t
= v1t +
εˆ2
ε2
(v2t − q2t) + q2t − gt = 0, (8)
∂VO
∂m
=
εˆ2
ε2
(v2m − q2m) + q2m − cm = 0. (9)
3We assume that an interior solution exists for each of the first-order conditions. This is assumed to hold
throughout this paper.
4We also consider the case where t and m are complements; i.e., both the tenant input function and the
landlord maintenance function become increasing functions. However, we do not obtain the result that both
the rental externality and tenure security reduce the quality of single-family rental housing. Therefore, the
theoretical predictions in the case of complements are inconsistent with conventional wisdom.
5The stability condition is assumed to hold throughout the paper. Furthermore, only the unique equilibrium
is considered below.
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From this condition, we obtain the functions tO(m) andmO(t). The equilibrium input levels, t
∗
O
and m∗O, can be found by solving Eqs (8) and (9) simultaneously, which yields the intersection
point of the two functions.6
Because owner-occupancy internalizes all payoff functions, the equilibrium input levels, t∗O
and m∗O, are efficient solutions. Therefore, we set q2(t
∗
O,m
∗
O) as the quality benchmark, and
compare this with rental quality. As mentioned, comparing the equilibrium quality level across
the tenure mode captures the effect of the rental externality.
2.1.1 Case U
First, compare Eq. (5) with Eq. (8) in case U where the tenant’s input represents a utilization
level. Therefore, t in Eq. (5) and Eq. (8) is replaced by u. Because q2u < 0, the marginal benefit
of u is larger in Eq. (5) than in Eq. (8), while the marginal costs are the same. Therefore,
uO(m) < uR(m) for all m. That is, the tenant ignores the landlord’s future benefit and has
an incentive to overutilize rental housing. Because we assume v2m > q2m, the marginal benefit
of m is smaller in Eq. (6) than in Eq. (9), while the marginal costs are the same. Therefore,
landlord maintenance in renter-occupied single-family housing is smaller than that in owner-
occupied single-family housing; i.e., mO(u) > mR(u) for all u. The landlord ignores the value
of the current tenant.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium input levels in case U. The functions are negatively
sloped, because u and m are substitutes. The equilibrium EO for owner-occupied single-family
housing is given by the intersection of uO(m) and mO(u). As mentioned above, a switch from
owning to renting causes the landlord’s maintenance curve to shift down frommO(u) tomR(u),
while the tenant’s utilization curve shifts up from uO(m) to uR(m). The result is an equilibrium
point for single-family rental housing (ER) at which there is an unambiguous decrease in
maintenance (m∗O > m
∗
R) and an unambiguous increase in utilization (u
∗
O < u
∗
R). The quality
of renter-occupied single-family housing therefore falls because of the rental externality; i.e.:
q2(u
∗
O,m
∗
O) > q2(u
∗
R,m
∗
R). (10)
6The second-order condition for a maximum is assumed to hold.
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Conventional wisdom is supported in case U.
2.1.2 Case I
Now consider case I (t = i). Because q2i > 0, the marginal benefit of i is smaller in Eq. (5) than
in Eq. (8). The tenant ignores the value of the building to the future tenant; consequently,
iO(m) > iR(m) for all m. We also have mO(i) > mR(i) for all i, because the marginal benefit
of m is smaller in Eq. (6) than in Eq.(9). Similarly to case U, the landlord ignores the value
of the current tenant.
Therefore, a switch from owning to renting causes both the tenant’s improvement curve
and the landlord’s maintenance curve to shift down because of the rental externality, e.g., from
mO(i) to mR(i) and from iO(m) to iR(m) as in Figure 2. That is, for any given maintenance
level by the other entity, each entity provides less than the efficient level of maintenance.
In equilibrium, there are three possible outcomes, depending on the magnitudes of the
shifts in the tenant’s improvement curve and the landlord’s maintenance curve. If the relative
size of the shifts are not different, then i∗O > i
∗
R and m
∗
O > m
∗
R in equilibrium. Because both
landlord and tenant inputs are maintenance in case I, the rental externality reduces single-
family rental housing quality. However, as in Figure 2, if the tenant’s improvement decreases
substantially while the landlord’s maintenance decreases just a little, the equilibrium becomes
i∗O > i
∗
R and m
∗
O < m
∗
R. In contrast, if the landlord’s maintenance decreases substantially
while the tenant’s improvement decreases just a little, the equilibrium becomes i∗O < i
∗
R and
m∗O > m
∗
R. The latter two possible outcomes show that the maintenance level of one of the
parties exceeds the optimal level. Therefore, it is possible for the quality of renter-occupied
single-family housing to exceed that of owner-occupied single-family housing. In sum, the effect
of the rental externality on housing quality is ambiguous in case I. Gatzlaff et al. (1998) found
no evidence of differences in housing quality between owner- and renter-occupied housing. Our
model can derive this in case I.
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2.2 The effects of tenure security
In this section, we define and introduce tenure security into the model. As mentioned, the
effect of tenure security on single-family housing quality varies within the tenure mode. Tenure
security, however, has no effect on owner-occupied single-family housing. Therefore, we only
consider single-family rental housing.
Tenure security has a variety of forms in the world as noted in Section 1. We now consider
the Japanese case prior to the empirical analysis of Japan below. Japan is a country that
shares a common feature with many other countries in the world. That is, tenure security
is complemented by rent control. In Japan, to prevent eviction by a rent increase, judicial
precedents from tenancy suits have established that the rent for an incumbent tenant, called
here contract-renewal rent, is not permitted to exceed the rent, called market rent, of similar
newly rented units. That is, the tenant retains the option to renew the leasehold coupled
with a below-market price forced on the landlord. In fact, contract-renewal rents approved
by the courts were lower than similar market rents when market rents increased markedly in
Japan. The regulatory effect of this judicial precedent is called contract-renewal rent control.
Therefore, in this paper, we define the Japanese tenant protection legislation as follows.
Definition 2 The tenant has an option to renew the contract with the contract-renewal rent
(1/α)P2, where α (α > 1).
If both the landlord and the initial tenant expect this to occur, the initial tenant’s choice
at the beginning of period 2 in a rental housing contract can be represented as follows:
{
F (ε˜2) = Pr
{
v2(t,m) ≥
1
α
[q2(t,m) + ε2]
}
⇒ renewal,
1− F (ε˜2) = Pr
{
v2(t,m) <
1
α
[q2(t,m) + ε2]
}
⇒ move.
(11)
The critical value changes as follows:
ε˜2 = ε˜2(t,m, α) = αv2(t,m)− q2(t,m).
Eq. (11) shows that it is possible that the initial tenant may not be able to renew the contract
under the Japanese tenant protection legislation. Because ∂ε˜2/∂α > 0, however, α indirectly
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increases the probability of renewal, and consequently increases the length of the lease in the
ex ante view. This means that contract-renewal rent control complements tenure security.
Therefore, α may imply the degree of tenure security.7
Noting Eq. (11) and the form of f(ε2), the utility of the tenant becomes:
V SR = v1(t)− P1 − g(t) +
ε˜2
ε2
[
v2(t,m)−
1
α
q2(t,m)−
1
α
ε˜2
2
]
, (12)
where superscript S refers to the case with tenure security.
In the case of tenure security, the landlord can obtain q2(t,m) + ε2 when the initial tenant
moves to other housing in period 2. However, he or she only obtains (1/α)[q2(t,m)+ ε2] when
the initial tenant renews the contract. Therefore, the profit for the landlord is as follows:
ΠSR = P1 − c(m) +
ε˜2
ε2
1
α
[
q2(t,m) +
ε˜2
2
]
+
ε2 − ε˜2
ε2
[
q2(t,m) +
ε2 + ε˜2
2
]
. (13)
The first-order conditions for Eqs (12) and (13) are:
∂V SR
∂t
= v1t +
ε˜2
ε2
(
v2t −
1
α
q2t
)
− gt = 0, (14)
∂ΠSR
∂m
=
(
ε˜2
ε2
1
α
+
ε2 − ε˜2
ε2
)
q2m +
ε˜2m
ε2
(
1
α
− 1
)
(q2 + ε˜2)− cm = 0, (15)
respectively. We obtain tSR(m,α) from Eq. (14), and m
S
R(t, α) from Eq. (15). The equilibrium
is the intersection point of tSR(m,α) and m
S
R(t, α), and is denoted by t
s
R and m
s
R.
2.2.1 Case U
Now compare the equilibrium input levels of renter-occupied housing with and without tenure
security in case U (t = u). Again t in Eq. (5) and Eq. (14) is replaced by u. Comparing
Eq. (5) and Eq. (14) indicates that uR(m) < u
S
R(m,α) for all m, given α > 1. The marginal
profit of u is increased by tenure security; consequently, wear and tear caused by the tenant’s
activities increases. This result is consistent with Sims (2007). Comparing Eq. (6) and Eq.
7In reality, there is the case where (contract-renewal) rent control is not binding. In this case α = 1. However,
we consider only the case where the control is binding (α > 1), because we are concerned with the effect of
tenure security.
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(15) reveals that mR(u) > m
S
R(u, α) for all u, given α > 1. The marginal profit of m is reduced
by tenure security; therefore, the landlord reduces home maintenance. This result is consistent
with Kanemoto (1990) and Seshimo (2003).
Figure 1 compares the equilibrium with tenure security (ESR) and without it (ER) for case
U. Tenure security causes the landlord’s maintenance curve to shift downward from mR(u)
to mSR(u, α), whereas the tenant’s utilization curve shifts upward from uR(m) to u
S
R(m,α).
Therefore, the intersection of the new curves moves to the northwest. As a result, tenure
security certainly increases u and decreases m in equilibrium; i.e., u∗R < u
s
R and m
∗
R > m
s
R.
The quality of renter-occupied single-family dwelling, therefore, is lowered because of tenure
security; i.e.:
q2(u
∗
R,m
∗
R) > q2(u
s
R,m
s
R). (16)
From Eq. (16), the model is unambiguous on the effect of tenure security on single-family
housing quality in case U.
Figure 1 also shows that the levels of both overutilization and undermaintenance according
to the rental externality are distorted more by tenure security. Combining Eq. (10) and Eq.
(16), we find that tenure security accelerates the deterioration of rental housing quality induced
initially by the effect of the rental externality in case U.
2.2.2 Case I
In case I (t = i), we have iR(m) < i
S
R(m,α) for all m and mR(i) > m
S
R(i, α) for all i, given
α > 1. As in Figure 2, the tenant’s improvement curve shifts upward, because tenure security
increases the probability of renewal to capture the benefit of the tenant’s own investment.
Tenure security, however, causes the landlord’s maintenance curve to shift downward, because
tenure security reduces the landlord’s profit. Therefore, the effect of tenure security on single-
family housing quality in case I is ambiguous because i∗R < i
s
R and m
∗
R > m
s
R in equilibrium.
Olsen (1988) argued that tenants in rent-controlled units maintain their housing, compensating
for landlords’ maintenance. Therefore, rent control does not necessarily deteriorate rental
housing quality. In our model, tenants in contract-renewal rent-controlled units maintain their
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housing, compensating for inadequate landlords’ maintenance in case I. This result is consistent
with Olsen (1988).
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The data and the empirical model
Our theoretical model predicts that the quality of renter-occupied single-family housing will
deteriorate relative to that of owner-occupied single-family housing according to the rental
externality, when the user’s input, which reduces the quality of the accommodation, and the
owner’s maintenance, which raises quality, are substitutes. In addition, tenure security ac-
celerates the deterioration of single-family rental housing. These theoretical predictions are
consistent with conventional wisdom. In contrast, the effects of the rental externality and
tenure security on rental housing quality are indeterminate when the user’s investment raises
the quality of the accommodation. In this section, we empirically test whether conventional
wisdom is supported or not in Japan. Unlike previous studies, we simultaneously consider the
effect of the rental externality and tenure security on the quality of renter-occupied single-
family housing.
We obtain the data from the 1998 JHDS. The JHDS is conducted by the Japanese Ministry
of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport every five years. The 1998 JHDS collected microlevel
cross-sectional data on 100,000 households in Japan. We use the sample of households who
dwell in a single-family house. In the theoretical model, both the tenant’s input and the
landlord’s maintenance have an important influence on single-family housing quality. These
variables, however, are not available. Therefore, we cannot directly estimate the quality of
housing. Some previous studies addressed this problem by looking at the physical condition of
housing units (Gyourko and Linneman 1990; Moon and Stotsky 1993; Sims 2007). Information
on the degree of dilapidation is also reported by the surveyor in the JHDS using the following
three categories: repairs not needed, or slight repairs needed; major repairs needed; and dilap-
idated beyond repair.8 As in Gyourko and Linneman (1990), we refer to housing needing no
8Information on the degree of dilapidation in a more recent survey (the 2003 JHDS) has changed. Therefore,
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or slight repairs as sound. Housing needing major repairs and dilapidated housing are referred
to as not sound. By defining the dummy variable Sound, the following probit specification is
estimated:
Pr(Sound = 1) = Φ(x′β), (17)
where Pr(Sound = 1) is the probability that the unit is sound, Φ is the standard normal cdf,
x is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is the vector of probit coefficients.9
Table 1 defines the variables that are used in the estimation of Eq. (17), and Table 2
describes their frequencies, means, or modes. Screening the data for complete information
on the selected variables, we obtain a sample of 41,253 observations on owner- and renter-
occupied single-family houses. Of these, 94.6% (39,013 dwellings) are owner-occupied single-
family houses, and 5.4% (2,240 dwellings) are renter-occupied single-family houses. Note that
90.1% of owner-occupied units are in structures reported as being in sound condition, while
75.5% of renter-occupied units are reported as sound.
We design the following three-way interaction terms to investigate the rental externality
and tenure security:
Renter-occupied× Building agej ×Moving timek. (18)
First, as mentioned in our theoretical model, the propensity to utilize and maintain the
dwelling varies across the tenure mode because of the rental externality. Therefore, we use
the renter-occupied housing dummies, with owner-occupied housing being the reference tenure
mode, which controls for building age and moving time, to capture the effect of the rental
externality by using the observations on owner- and renter-occupied single-family housing. We
control building age j (built pre-1970; built 1971 − 1980; built 1981 − 1990; and built 1991 −
we use the 1998 JHDS.
9The dummy variable, Sound, is defined as follows:
Sound = 1 if q2 > q¯2,
Sound = 0 otherwise,
where q¯2 is the critical quality of not being sound.
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1998), because the older the building, the lower the probability it is in sound condition. We also
control tenancy duration, because the longer-duration renter-occupied housing is protected by
tenure security. The JHDS records the year of relocation to the present dwelling; therefore,
we control moving time k (moved in pre-1970; moved in 1971 − 1980; moved in 1981 − 1990;
and moved in 1991 − 1998).10 In the older category, periods for tenancy duration are longer.
Therefore, we assume that tenure security is less likely to influence the group with the most
recent moving time. We set owner-occupied housings constructed between 1991 and 1998, into
which respondents moved during the same period, as the reference group. Then, the sign of
the renter-occupied housing dummies, where k = 1991− 1998, shows us the effect of the rental
externality.
Secondly, we examine how the estimated coefficients of the moving-in year dummies vary
from the benchmark years, (k = 1991 − 1998) in Eq. (18), to capture the effect of tenure
security. We expect that the coefficients for the renter-occupied housing dummies (renter-
occupied housing dummies in Eq. (18) are 1) vary across moving-in year dummies, because the
longer-duration housing is protected by tenure security. As suggested by theory, the propensity
to utilize and maintain the dwelling varies within the tenure mode because of tenure security.
On the other hand, we expect that the quality of owner-occupied single-family housing does not
depend on tenancy duration, because tenure security has no impact on this type of dwelling.
Therefore, we should observe that the coefficients of the Building agej×Moving timek dummies
(note that the reference tenure mode is owner-occupied housing) remain constant.
3.2 Estimation results
Table 3 presents the probit coefficients and marginal effects of the rental externality and tenure
security on single-family housing quality.11
The coefficients in bold indicate the effect of the rental externality. The statistically signif-
10If the current house was rebuilt on the same site after the respondent moved in, we have equated the move-in
year to the rebuilt year.
11The marginal effects are calculated as:
Pr(Sound = 1)|dummy variable = 1 − Pr(Sound = 1)|dummy variable =0.
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icant sign of the bold coefficients for the renter-occupied housing dummy (except for housing
moved into between 1991 and 1998 and constructed before 1970) implies that renter-occupied
single-family dwellings has a lower probability of being in sound condition than owner-occupied
single-family units. These results suggest that the rental externality reduces the quality of
renter-occupied single-family dwellings in Japan.
The coefficients in italics indicate the effect of tenure security on renter-occupied single-
family dwellings. Note that all of these figures have a statistically significant negative sign.
Figure 3 shows the relationships between tenancy duration and housing quality for owner-
occupied single-family houses, which are obtained from Table 3. As expected, Figure 3 shows
that the quality of owner-occupied single-family housing does not depend much on tenancy
duration. By adding the marginal effect of owner-occupied housing with moving time k con-
trolled by building age j (j × k) and that of the renter-occupied housing dummy, we obtain
the gross marginal effect of tenure security on renter-occupied housing measured by j× k. For
example, the gross marginal effect of renter-occupied housing with move-in period 1971 to 1980
constructed between 1971 and 1980 becomes (−0.130 − 0.103) = −0.233 (−23.3%). Figure 4
shows that the more recent the move-in date, the smaller the absolute value of the marginal
effect (except for housing moved into between 1981 and 1990 and constructed before 1970).
This implies that the longer the tenancy duration, the greater the extent of deterioration.
Therefore, tenure security further reduces the quality of single-family rental housing in Japan.
The result confirms the theoretical prediction of case U where the tenant’s input represents
utilization, because both the rental externality and tenure security reduce the quality of single-
family rental dwellings.12
4 Discussion
There are several considerations in the interpretation of both the theoretical and the empirical
results. The first consideration is related to additional investment. Kanemoto (1990) theoret-
12The landlord may structure a lease to induce responsible behavior by the tenant. Benjamin et al. (1995)
showed that some form of variable lease payments, e.g., imposing a security deposit or penalty fee, or discounting
the rent for good users, may mitigate overutilization by the tenant. Although this information is not available,
our results show that variable lease payments do not work well in the Japanese rental housing market.
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ically examined the relationship between additional investment and tenure mode; however, we
ignore the additional investment strategies in period 2. That is, all investment decisions are
determined in the first period in our theoretical model. Moon and Stotsky (1993) showed the
principal advantage of using a longitudinal data set for investigating the effect of rent control.
This may be because the dynamic decisions of maintenance are important for determining
housing quality. Unfortunately, our empirical model cannot capture the dynamic change in
housing quality, because the data set is cross-sectional. The second consideration is the link
between the theoretical model and our empirical model. The theoretical model is a forward-
looking model. Because the landlord and the tenant anticipate the lower contract-renewal rent
because of tenure security, they change their present input levels. This will change future
housing quality. In contrast, the JHDS provides information on current housing quality. We
try to capture the effects of tenure security on differences in housing quality between recent
and earlier movers. Therefore, the time axis is different between the theoretical model and the
empirical model. However, if the quality of housing in the future depends on the present level
of inputs, then current housing quality may depend on the past level of inputs. This interpre-
tation may combine the theoretical model with our empirical model. The third consideration
is also the link between the theoretical analysis and the empirical analysis. Tenancy duration
(stay or move decision) is an endogenous variable in the theoretical model; however, we treat
it as exogenous in our empirical analysis. Using longitudinal data, Seko and Sumita (2007)
estimated a proportional hazard model to investigate the effect of tenure security on tenancy
duration in Japan. Their empirical results showed that tenure security depresses renter mo-
bility. However, we cannot control this because our data set is cross-sectional, as mentioned
above. These three issues remain for future research.
5 Conclusion
It is widely believed that the quality of renter-occupied housing is lower than that of owner-
occupied housing as a result of the rental externality and tenure security. However, several
papers have objected to this conventional wisdom. In this paper, we showed the conditions
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under which conventional wisdom is supported. Unlike the previous studies, we developed a
model to determine simultaneously the effect of the rental externality and tenure security on the
quality of single-family houing. We focused on both maintenance by the owner and utilization
by the user. Although both tenant and landlord inputs are important, previous studies that
have supported conventional wisdom have only examined these inputs in isolation. We first
compared single-family housing quality across the tenure mode to obtain the effect of the rental
externality. Then we compared the quality of single-family dwelling within the tenure mode
to obtain the effect of tenure security. Our main theoretical results are summarized below.
Because owner-occupancy internalizes both the user’s and the owner’s net benefit, the
input levels become efficient. In contrast, when both maintenance by the landlord, which
raises the quality of the accommodation, and utilization by the tenant, which reduces quality,
are not verifiable, and if they are substitutes, a rental contract for housing creates a rental
externality problem: the initial tenant overutilizes the housing and the landlord undermaintains
it. Therefore, in this case, the quality of renter-occupied single-family housing is lower than
that of owner-occupied single-family housing because of the rental externality. Tenure security
that is guaranteed by contract-renewal rent control in Japan lowers the contract-renewal rent,
defined as the rent for an incumbent tenant, which is not permitted to exceed the rent for
similar newly rented units. Therefore, tenure security further increases tenants’ utilization and
decreases landlords’ maintenance. In this situation, tenure security accelerates deterioration
of the quality of single-family rental housing in conjunction with the rental externality. These
theoretical predictions are consistent with conventional wisdom. However, if tenants’ input
raises quality, the effect of the rental externality and tenure security on rental housing quality
is indeterminate. Therefore, our model also supports the theoretically ambiguous case.
Using a cross-section of 41,253 observations on owner- and renter-occupied single-family
houses from the 1998 JHDS, we tested our theoretical predictions empirically. Unlike the pre-
vious studies, our equation simultaneously considers the rental externality and tenure security.
To test our theoretical predictions, we estimated a probit model: housing units are in sound
condition or not. We obtained the following empirical results.
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The empirical test for the rental externality showed that renter-occupied single-family hous-
ing is less likely to be in sound condition than owner-occupied single-family housing. Further-
more, the empirical results confirmed that tenure security accelerates deterioration in the qual-
ity of single-family rental housing: renter-occupied units in longer tenancy are less likely to be
in sound condition than units in shorter tenancy. Therefore, our empirical results confirm the
theoretical predictions when tenants’ utilization, which reduces quality, and landlords’ main-
tenance, which raises quality, are substitutes. Conventional wisdom is empirically supported
for single-family housing in Japan.
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Table 1 Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Sound A binary variable indicating the unit is in sound condition.
Renter-occupied A binary variable indicating the unit is renter-occupied single-
family housing.
Built pre-1970 A binary variable indicating the unit was built pre-1970.
Built 1971–1980 A binary variable indicating the unit was built 1971–1980.
Built 1981–1990 A binary variable indicating the unit was built 1981–1990.
Built 1991–1998 A binary variable indicating the unit was built 1991–1998.
Moved in pre-1970 A binary variable indicating the household moved in pre-1970.
Moved in 1971–1980 A binary variable indicating the household moved in 1971–1980.
Moved in 1981–1990 A binary variable indicating the household moved in 1981–1990.
Moved in 1991–1998 A binary variable indicating the household moved in 1991–1998.
Wooden The building whose main frames are made of wood (reference).
SRC A binary variable indicating the building whose main frames
are made of steel-reinforced concrete.
Block A binary variable indicating the building whose outer walls are
made of blocks.
Others A binary variable indicating the building whose main frames
are made of another construction material.
Tokyo A binary variable indicating the unit is located in one of 23
Tokyo wards.
Large city A binary variable indicating the unit is located in one of 12
major cities outside Tokyo.
Other area The unit is located in any other area (reference).
Room Number of rooms in the unit.
Income Running number from 1 (the lowest) to 9 (the highest) of total
annual income (before tax) earned by all household members.
Number of observations 41,253
Table 2 Frequency/mean/mode of variables
Variable All observations Owner-occupied Renter-occupied
Sound 89.3 90.1 75.5
Renter-occupied 5.4
Built pre-1970 26.3 25.7 35.9
Built 1971–1980 29.3 29.1 32.3
Built 1981–1990 24.9 25.1 21.6
Built 1991–1998 19.6 20.2 10.2
Moved in pre-1970 22.7 23.5 8.4
Moved in 1971–1980 26.2 27.1 10.1
Moved in 1981–1990 26.0 26.1 24.6
Moved in 1991–1998 25.1 23.3 57.0
Wooden 92.3 92.2 95.1
SRC 5.5 5.6 3.6
Block 0.4 0.4 0.3
Others 1.8 1.9 1.0
Tokyo 1.7 1.7 1.8
Large city 10.2 10.0 14.4
Other area 88.1 88.4 83.8
Room 6.0 6.1 4.0
Income 5 5 3
Number of observations 41,253 39,013 2,240
Table 3 Probit coefficients and marginal effects
Variable Coefficient Standard error Marginal effect
Intercept 1.656∗∗∗ 0.051
Built pre-1970
Moved in pre-1970 −1.386∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.199∗∗∗
Moved in 1971–1980 −1.332∗∗∗ 0.078 −0.191∗∗∗
Moved in 1981–1990 −1.308∗∗∗ 0.099 −0.187∗∗∗
Moved in 1991–1998 −1.380∗∗∗ 0.114 −0.198∗∗∗
Built 1971–1980
Moved in 1971–1980 −0.911∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.130∗∗∗
Moved in 1981–1990 −0.848∗∗∗ 0.074 −0.122∗∗∗
Moved in 1991–1998 −0.883∗∗∗ 0.089 −0.127∗∗∗
Built 1981–1990
Moved in 1981–1990 −0.464∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.067∗∗∗
Moved in 1991–1998 −0.479∗∗∗ 0.097 −0.069∗∗∗
Built pre-1970×Renter-occupied
Moved in pre-1970 −0 .474 ∗∗∗ 0.095 −0.068∗∗∗
Moved in 1971–1980 −0 .477 ∗∗∗ 0.134 −0.068∗∗∗
Moved in 1981–1990 −0 .518 ∗∗∗ 0.127 −0.074∗∗∗
Moved in 1991–1998 −0.125 0.132 −0.018
Built 1971–1980×Renter-occupied
Moved in 1971–1980 −0 .718 ∗∗∗ 0.129 −0.103∗∗∗
Moved in 1981–1990 −0 .395 ∗∗∗ 0.118 −0.057∗∗∗
Moved in 1991–1998 −0.343∗∗∗ 0.107 −0.049∗∗∗
Built 1981–1990×Renter-occupied
Moved in 1981–1990 −0 .641 ∗∗∗ 0.129 −0.092∗∗∗
Moved in 1991–1998 −0.295∗∗ 0.129 −0.042∗∗
Built 1991–1998×Renter-occupied
Moved in 1991–1998 −0.407∗∗∗ 0.149 −0.058∗∗∗
SRC 0.190∗∗∗ 0.049
Block −0.255∗∗ 0.127
Others 0.111 0.092
Tokyo −0.335∗∗∗ 0.063
Large city 0.046 0.030
Room 0.044∗∗∗ 0.006
Income 0.057∗∗∗ 0.005
Number of observations 41, 253
Pseudo R2 0.130
Log-likelihood −12204.04
Bold figures capture the effect of the rental externality.
Italic figures capture the effect of tenure security.
∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1%; ∗∗ indicates significance at 5%
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Fig. 3 The effect of tenure security on owner-occupied single-family housing 
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Fig. 4 The effect of tenure security on renter-occupied single-family housing 
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